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#### THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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May 27, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ The Secretary of State

> THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Analysis of Build-down Proposals (U)

In his May 12 letter to Senators Cohen, Nunn, and Fercy, the President indicated his conditional endorsement of the build-down concept and his commitment to work with them to develop a concrete proposal reflecting this endorsement. (U)

The START Interagency Group should produce an analysis which identifies and evaluates alternative build-down proposals which satisfy the criteria listed in the President's May 12 letter. It should also offer its critical assessment of alternatives, whether meeting the President's criteria or not, which have or which it anticipates may be proposed to the Administration for consideration in the upcoming weeks. (U)

This analysis should address the following questions with regard to build-down and START: (U)

- Are there alternatives/options that are clearly in the US national security interest and that could be implemented now? (C)
- Are there alternatives/options that appear promising and worthy of additional study? (C)
- Are there alternatives/options that have been proposed that should be rejected and eliminated at this time from further consideration? (C)
- How would alternatives/options that are under consideration relate to our position in START? Would they complement our achievement of our fundamental objectives in START or detract from, or delay the achievement of these objectives? (S)
- And, based on the above, what should be the stance that the Administration should take with the Congress on this subject until a suitable alternative/option is developed and implemented? (C)

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An initial version of the paper documenting this analysis should be provided no later than May 31. This initial version will be used to support the discussion of this area at the June 7th NSC meeting on START. A more complete version of the same paper reflecting the NSC discussion and further analysis as tasked should be completed as soon as possible following the NSC meeting. (U)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

illiam R. Cla

cc: The Director of Central Intelligence Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Chairman U.S. START Delegation MAY 27 P7: 46

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### Draft Presidential Letter

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Thank you for your letter of April 29 concerning the Report of my Commission on Strategic Forces. I agree with your assessment that it "contains the elements necessary to move the United States toward a posture in which force modernization and arms control can produce a more stable world."

Please be assured that I fully endorse the findings of the Commission, and that, like its members, I view them as part of an integral package. In fact, I am now conducting a full review of our START proposal to see what adjustments should be made in the light of the Report. While this effort will take some time, I want you to know that I take the arms control sections of the Report seriously. My review is aimed at developing a revision to our START policy reflecting the Commission's judgment that, over the long run,

arms control limitations and reductions [should] be couched, not in terms of launchers, but in terms of warheads of roughly equivalent yield.

As the Report notes,

[t]he current Administration's START proposal is centered on warhead limitations and reductions, with some attention to throw-weight limitations. These are consistent with the Commission's recommended program. It also contains a proposed limit on launchers that the Commission believes should be reassessed since it is not compatible with a desirable evolution toward small, single-warhead ICBMs.

This reassessment, which is currently underway, has already been discussed at an NSC meeting.

The Commission Report has been very helpful in clarifying

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draft letter, page 2

the goals of our arms control policy. In the course of our reassessment, we are guided by the same principles. In particular, we will try to implement, consistent with the requirement that any agreement be effectively verifiable, the Commission's recommendation that we strive for

relatively simple agreements, using appropriate counting rules, that exert pressure to reduce the overall number and destructive power of nuclear weapons and at the same time give each side an incentive to move toward more stable and less vulnerable deployments.

We are aiming for the type of arms control agreement described in the Commission's Report, that is, an agreement that would be

simple and flexible enough to permit stabilizing development and modernization programs, while imposing quantitative limits and reductions.

We also understand that

each side will naturally desire to configure its own strategic forces. [Therefore] simple aggregate limits of this sort are likely to be more practical, stabilizing, and lasting than elaborate, detailed limitations on force structure and modernization whose ultimate consequences cannot be confidently anticipated.

In the same spirit, my Administration is committed to an immediate start on research and development of a new, small, single-warhead ICBM. If we can maintain sufficient Congressional and public support, there is no reason why this missile cannot be ready to be deployed in the early 1990's.

I believe that, if implemented flexibly and within the context of our START proposal, a guaranteed mutual build down could be a useful mechanism by which to achieve the reductions

in destabilizing nuclear weapons systems that we all seek. In order not to be counterproductive, however, any build down agreement would have to recognize not only the importance of strategic modernization, but also the differences between stabilizing and destabilizing systems, and the necessity of restoring and maintaining a balance during the reductions process. On the other hand, an excessively rigid build down proposal could be dangerously destabilizing and could serve to aggravate, rather than redress, the imbalances that currently exist in the strategic situation. My Administration is currently examining the possibility of structuring a build down proposal which would meet these criteria, would be effectively verifiable, and would be achievable in the context of START negotiations embodying substantial reductions in ballistic missile forces.

the Scowcroft Commission Report, and the bipartisan support it has attracted, offer the country an invaluable opportunity to put behind us the differences which have divided us with respect to the intertwined issues of strategic force modernization and arms control. For our part, using formal or informal mechanisms, we will do everything we can to preserve and build upon that consensus in implementing the recommendations and suggestions of the Commission. Our success in charting a consensus course will itself be a major victory and will give renewed hope to all those around the world who depend upon us as the ultimate guarantor of their freedom and security.